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SCHOLARSHIP PLANS AS A SECURITY: WHY CAN'T

JOHNNY'S PARENTS READ?
In 1961 the Florida legislature authorized the operation of cooperative scholarship plans.' Offering a novel method of financing college
education, these plans have experienced rapid growth.2 Three such
plans are presently operating in Florida, 8 and increasing numbers of
people are investing money in them. 4 In addition, this development has
spread to other states; similar plans have been established in Louisiana,
Tennessee, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Iowa. 5 With this expansion
has come a serious need for investor protection. What form this protection should take and by whom it should be supplied are problems
which deserve immediate attention.
I
A

DANGEROUS INVESTMENT

Scholarship plans purport to help participants finance higher
education. A purchaser of a plan initially pays the "Sponsor"0 an administrative fee and a sales load. He also agrees to open a savings
account in a federally insured bank or savings and loan association,7
into which he deposits a specified amount either in a lump sum or in
monthly installments. He must maintain this account intact for a
specified period of time, during which the earnings are irrevocably
1 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 617.50-.81 (Supp. 1969).

2 From 1962 through 1966, one trust fund sold approximately 9500 plans. The
Trust Fund Sponsored by the Scholarship Club, Inc., SEC Investment Co. Act Release
No. 5524, at 6 n.11 (Oct. 25, 1968) [hereinafter cited as SEC Release].
3 The American College Foundation, the Episcopal School Foundation College Award
Program, Inc., and the Scholarship Club, Inc. are all registered with the Florida State

Treasurer pursuant to FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.532 (Supp. 1969).
4 As of December 1967, the trust fund of the Scholarship Club aggregated $95,624.82.
Brief for Applicant at 89, The Trust Fund Sponsored by the Scholarship Club, Inc., SEC
Investment Co. Act Release No. 5524 (Oct. 25, 1968) [hereinafter cited as Applicant's
Brief].
5 Green, Scholarship Funds, New Approach to Saving for College, Ensnarled by Wary
Regulators, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1968, at 22, col. 1, discusses the recent expansion of the
scholarship plans and reports that one plan has hopes of going nation-wide. In examining
anticipated growth, the article points to one plan operating in Canada since 1961 which
has 37,000 subscribers and over $23 million in deposits.
6 In Florida the "Sponsor" must be a non-profit corporation. FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 617.50(3) (Supp. 1969).
7 SEC Release, supra note 2, at 2; Episcopal School Foundation College Award Program, Regulation § 2B (Rev. Nov. 1967) [hereinafter cited as CAP Regs.].
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assigned to a trust set up by the Sponsor. The money assigned to the
trust fund will be invested in securities." One plan requires an administrative fee and sales load totaling $160. 9 Under this plan the purchaser
deposits either $1,600 on which earnings amounting to $564 should
accrue over a period of eight and one-half years, 10 or monthly installments of $227.27 on which earnings amounting to $566 should accrue
over a period of eleven years.'
When the purchaser opens the savings account, he designates a
beneficiary.' 2 If the purchaser makes all of the required payments,
and if the beneficiary successfully enters college, the money in the savings account is returned to the purchaser and may be employed to offset
the cost of the first year. The beneficiary then receives from the trust
fund money to help pay for all or a part of the cost of the remaining
three years.'8
The purchaser assumes the risk of forfeiture upon either his or
the beneficiary's disqualification. For example, he can withdraw his
money from the savings account at any time, but if he does so prior to
the beneficiary's entrance into college, the beneficiary is no longer
eligible for an award and the purchaser automatically forfeits the earnings assigned to the trust fund. Similarly, if the purchaser fails to make
all the payments under an installment plan, or if the designated beneficiary does not enter college or fails to complete the first year of study,
then disqualification occurs and the assigned earnings are forfeited. 14
The earnings thus relinquished supplement the scholarships given to
eligible beneficiaries.
Forfeiture by some persons is essential for the satisfactory operation
of the scholarship plans as presently organized. The funds have an
SEC Release, supra note 2, at 2; CAP kegs., supra note 7, at § 2D.
9 This amount must be paid by purchasers of the Scholarship Club's plan. SEC
Release, supra note 2, at 4 n.4. The plan offered by the Episcopal School Foundation
College Award Program entails a "membership fee" of $175. The Trust Fund Sponsored
by the Episcopal School Foundation College Award Program, Inc., SEC Hearing Examiner's Initial Decision, Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-1374, at 3 (Oct. 24, 1968) [hereinafter cited as ESFCAP Initial Decision].
10 SEC Release, supra note 2, at 4 n.4.
1l Id. at 3, 4 n.4.
12 The purchaser can select any child as beneficiary whether kin or not. See,
for example, the Episcopal School Foundation College Award Program, CAP kegs., supra
note 7, at § 1E.
13 SEC Release, supra note 2, at 3; CAP kegs., supra note 7, at § 10C.
14 These are the conditions of forfeiture generally adopted by the Scholarship Club.
SEC Release, supra note 2, at 2-3. The Episcopal School Foundation College Award Program
has adopted substantially the same conditions. CAP Regs., supra note 7, at §§ 5A, 15.
8
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extremely conservative investment policy, investing primarily in municipal bonds, time deposits or United States government securities.15
The return from these securities alone could not meet a significant
portion of college expenses of the participating beneficiaries. The real
inducement to purchase a scholarship plan is not the investment performance of the fund, but the possibility of a substantial profit through
the forfeiture of others.
The necessity for forfeiture may pressure the Sponsor into structuring the plan to encourage it. Strict payment schedules could precipitate
the forfeiture of an installment plan purchaser who is but a few days
late in meeting his monthly obligation. A temporary setback in high
school could disqualify a beneficiary for failure to make satisfactory
progress toward college entrance. Once in college the beneficiary
could be required to maintain a high average.
Yet for those who feel the need to finance college on the installment basis, the loss through forfeiture would be a severe hardship.
A purchaser whose beneficiary fails to qualify for an award may lose
over $600 assigned to the trust fund plus interest on this money.' 6 The
possible effect of forfeiture plus the inherent reliance upon loss for
the plan's successful operation poses the real danger that incidences of
disqualification may be so numerous and so complex as to result in an
7
unconscionable risk for the investor.'
Another danger created by the essential part forfeiture plays in
the plans is that they will be sold intentionally to those most likely to
lapse in their payments or whose children enjoy the least opportunity
to succeed in college. Assuming a specific intent to encourage forfeiture,
such would be the case where a ten-year installment plan is sold to
elderly grandparents; or where a plan is sold to parents whose child,
due to economic and social factors, has little chance to complete high
school; or where a plan is sold to someone in such severe financial
'5 Such has been the policy of the Scholarship Club. SEC Release, supra note 2, at 4.
The fund assets of the Episcopal School Foundation College Award Program are kept in
"cash interest-bearing savings accounts." ESFCAP Initial Decision, supra note 9, at 4.
16 The maximum forfeiture -under the Scholarship Club's plan, as it now stands,
would be approximately $600 plus the $160 sales load. Under the Episcopal School Foundation College Award Program the forfeiture could exceed $660 plus the $175 "membership
fee." See ESFCAP Initial Decision, supra note 9, at 4.
17 Although this danger does exist it has not yet materialized. The Episcopal School
Foundation College Award Program allows 80 days to cure default upon notice thereof.
CAP Regs., supra note 7, at § 5C. Also, the Florida statute requires that the requisite scholastic achievement cannot exceed that of the institution attended. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.52(g)

(Supp. 1969).
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straits that the odds of his completing ten years of payments would be
slim. Such also would be the case where a plan is sold to parents with
a retarded child.18
The most troublesome aspect of the plans, however, is the difficulty
and uncertainty in choosing a method of distributing the scholarship
awards. Two unknowns must be taken into account in order to determine the amount of any scholarship: the number of beneficiaries who
will qualify and the total assets which the trust fund will have available
for distribution. These variables make uncertain the award which
eligible beneficiaries will receive. Past performance does not provide
a basis for estimating future profits; the plans are a recent phenomenon, 19 and the average one runs at least eight to ten years.2 0 As a
result, no money to date has been paid to any student and no exact
figure can be promised.21 In fact, a purchaser of a scholarship plan may
be instructed that possibly the award will not be sufficient to cover the
22
entire cost of three years of college education.
These unknowns, however, do not make it impossible for the
Sponsors to arrive at definite plans by which the available funds will be
allocated among those who are eligible.23 Yet in formulating such
plans the Sponsors must seek to avoid certain dangers. The most
serious is the possibility that no method of distribution will produce
an equitable award. Although no amount may be technically promised,
the purchaser, willing to assume the substantial risk of forfeiture, necessarily anticipates a considerable profit from his investment. Contemplating the expense of three years' college education, the plan itself is
geared to encourage this expectation. Yet, because of the unknown
18 Brief for SEC at 12, The Trust Fund Sponsored by the Scholarship Club, Inc.,
SEC Investment Co. Act Release No. 5524 (Oct. 25, 1968), cites one instance where a
plan actually was sold to a parent with a mentally deficient child.
19 The Scholarship Club, for example, was organized in 1961, and the Episcopal School
Foundation College Award Program began operation in 1965.
20 C.S.T. Foundation, however, which has been operating in Canada since 1961, has
experienced an annual drop-out rate of over 10%. Green, Scholarship Funds, New Approach to Saving for College, Ensnarled by Wary Regulators, Wall St. J., Dec. 27, 1968,
at 22, col. 1.
21 Yet the Episcopal School Foundation College Award Program, while guaranteeing
no specific amount, did represent that anticipated scholarships should provide $1,500 or
more per year for three years. ESFCAP Initial Decision, supra note 9, at 7.
22 This is the practice to be followed by the Scholarship Club. SEC Release, supra
note 2, at 5-6.
23 The Scholarship Club has yet to formulate such a plan. Id. at 6. The Episcopal
School Foundation College Award Program has devised a plan based on the year of anticipated college entrance. CAP Regs., supra note 7, at § 10C. The Florida statute requires that
a plan of distribution be submitted to the State Treasurer. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.55(2)(c)
(Supp. 1969).
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forfeiture rate,"4 the plan can offer no assurance that the award will be
satisfactory. It is possible that there will be few forfeitures and, therefore, the returns may be relatively small. Low returns are a risk assumed
in all investment schemes, but where there may be an implied assurance
of one amount (i.e., cost of three years of college), 25 a lower return
cannot be justified.
A subsidiary problem in this area concerns the possibility of inconsistent scholarships. In some years the trust funds may realize
sufficient earnings to provide satisfactory awards, while in other years
they may not. The danger exists, therefore, that the distribution will
be disproportionate. Any mechanical formula, for instance, which
classified the beneficiaries by year of anticipated college entry and divided annually among the actual scholarship recipients of that class the
available funds, could produce a large variance in yearly allocations.
This might prove misleading for a purchaser induced to enter a plan
on the basis of past performance.
II
THE TOTAL PROHIBrrION APPROACH
One argument for prohibiting the plans is based on the fear
that they will fail to realize adequate awards. Yet this is not a foregone
conclusion and the mere risk of such a result does not qualitatively
distinguish the scholarship plans from most unquestionably legitimate
investments. Other aspects of the scheme do. The amount of the award
essentially depends upon chance. 26 The purchaser is "gambling" that
the number of forfeitures will be high. The success of his investment
rests not upon a lawful business enterprise, but upon the misfortune of
27
other purchasers.
24 The Scholarship Club testified before the SEC that the method of distribution was
not an "actuarial problem." SEC Release, supra note 2, at 6. The Florida statute suggests
otherwise. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.55(3)(b) (Supp. 1969). In any event the plans have not
been operating long enough to gather sufficient information to estimate a reliable rate of
forfeiture.
26 See note 21 supra.

-

26 "Chance" has been defined as the "attempt to attain certain ends, not by skill or
any known or fixed rules, but by the happening of a subsequent event, incapable of
ascertainment or accomplishment by means of human foresight or ingenuity." United
States v. Rich, 90 F. Supp. 624, 627 (E D. Ill. 1950), quoting 17 R.CJL. 1223. Chance, of
course, would be eliminated if the rate of forfeiture became ascertainable. It is also possible
that the investment of fund assets may in the future become a significant source of income.
27 An argument can be made that the scholarship plans are actually lotteries. A
lottery is any scheme that entails consideration, prize and chance. FCC v. American
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The concomitant problem of forfeiture is even more disturbing.
Although the investor might fully realize the nature of the risk, it
remains highly questionable whether the possibility of such loss is
acceptable under any circumstances. Besides the general argument of
unconscionability, 28 Congress, in the Investment Company Act of
1940,29 has specifically prohibited such forfeitures,3 0 evidencing an intent to outlaw the operative fact of the scholarship plans.31 This
strongly suggests that the risk assumed by the scholarship plan investor
exceeds that normally associated with an investment and contravenes
public policy.
Perhaps the most fundamental policy argument against these plans
is that they will operate, in effect, to enrich one class at the expense of
another. It is inevitable that the poor, uneducated purchaser whose
children may lack the requisite motivation will suffer a high rate of
forfeiture. At the same time, however, plans will be sold to purchasers
of more able means who would be able to afford sending their children
to college without assistance. Beneficiaries of this class, for whom college may very well be the natural extension of education, will likely
qualify for an award. The situation will result, therefore, where those
most in need will find themselves financing college education for
32
those who actually do not require a "scholarship."
The arguments in support of prohibiting the plans, although
persuasive, have not been heeded. Florida has legalized and encouraged
the scheme,3 3 and the other states in which the scholarship plans have
been established have also refused to take repressive action. This implies
a belief that the speculative and future benefits from the plans outweigh
the obvious and immediate dangers. Such a position is justified, however,
Broadcasting Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954). Yet the fact that the amount of the scholarship may
depend on chance is not necessarily controlling. Qualification for an award has nothing
to do with chance. The beneficiary must complete the first year of college. The purchaser,
exercising judgment in selecting a beneficiary whom he feels will be scholastically successful, must make all payments.
28 See, eg., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §§ 2-302, 2719(3).
29 54 Stat. 789 (1940), 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1964).
30 54 Stat. 829 (1940), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-27(c)(1) (1964).
31 S.Rm. No. 1775, 76th Cong., 3d Sess. 19 (1940).
32 Elimination of the plans could be effected with little trouble. The states could
declare the plans illegal on the grounds of public policy. Such action would be upheld as
a reasonable exercise of the police power. Most states outlaw lotteries as do certain federal

statutes. A determination that the plans were lotteries, therefore, would also bring about
the demise of the scholarship plans. But see note 27 supra. Another alternative is created
by the federal securities laws under which the SEC, at its discretion, is empowered to
prohibit the selling of such plans to the public. See pp. 785-88 infra.
33 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 617.50-.81 (Supp. 1969).
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only if adequate investor protection exists. In turn, this depends upon
the applicability of federal securities regulation to the scholarship plans.
III
SEC

REGULATION

In October 1968, in The Trust Fund Sponsored by the Scholarship
Club, Inc.,3 4 the SEC held that a Florida trust fund offering scholarship
plans was an "investment company" subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940.36 The Commission also held the scholarship plans
to be securities, since by definition an investment company is an issuer
of "securities."3 6 Although arguments were made against holding
funds to be investment companies, 3 7 and against calling the plans
securities, 38 the SEC, motivated by the obvious need for investor
34 SEC Release, supra note 2.
35 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to -52 (1964).
86 Section 3(a) of the Act defines an "investment company" as an issuer which:
(1) Ms or holds itself out as being engaged primarily, or proposes to engage
primarily, in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities;
(2) is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of issuing face-amount
certificates of the installment type, or has been engaged in such business and
has any such certificate outstanding; or
(3)is engaged or proposes to engage in the business of investing, reinvesting,
owning, holding, or trading in securities, and owns or proposes to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such
issuer's total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an
unconsolidated basis.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a) (1964).
The SEC did not discuss the status of the trust fund, but only noted that the question
as to its being an "issuer" had not been raised. SEC Release, supra note 2, at 4 n.5.
37 The applicant in this hearing argued: that it did not issue "face-amount certificates"
as defined in § 2(a)(15) of the 1940 Act because it was not obligated to pay a stated and
fixed sum of money at maturity; that all of its assets were cash items and therefore did
not involve "investment securities" as defined in § 3(a)(3) of the 1940 Act; and that it
does not engage primarily nor does it propose to engage primarily in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities because its investment is secondary to its primary
purpose of providing funds for college expenses. As a result, concluded the applicant, it
did not fall within the definition of an in~iestment company found in §§ 8(a)(2), (3), or
(1) of the 1940 Act. See Applicant's Brief at 52-66.
38 In his article, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There A More Meaningful
Formula?, 18 CAsE W. Rs. L. Rxv. 367 (1967), Coffey developed a practical test by which
to determine the existence of a "security." He combined the expectation of profit from an
enterprise managed solely by others (SEC v. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946)) with the risk
of loss from the enterprise (SEC v. Joiner Corp., 820 U.S. 344 (1943)). The scholarship
plans would not necessarily meet these requirements. The real profit comes not from the
investment of fund earnings, but from the forfeiture of other purchasers. Conversely, the
real risk stems from the possibility that the forfeiture rate will be low, or that the purchaser himself may forfeit. In this respect, then, there is no genuine risk of loss or expecta-
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protection and perhaps by the absence of alternatives,39 turned a deaf

40
ear to those appeals and found coverage.
Making the federal securities law applicable to scholarship plans
solves some of the problems they raise. The Securities Exchange Act
of 193441 mitigates the danger that these plans will be sold to those
most likely to forfeit. The SEC has recently promulgated a "suitability
rule" pursuant to section 15 of the 1934 Act 42 which will assure regulation of all sellers of the scholarship plans. Under this rule a broker,
before recommending a security, must have grounds for believing that
the security is suitable on the basis of information furnished by the
customer after reasonable inquiry.4 The rule will not apply to those

sellers who are NASD members, 44 but this organization has its own

self-imposed suitability rule which is identical with the Commission's. 45
However, the SEC is best able to deal with the scholarship plans
under the Investment Company Act of 1940.46 Holding the trust fund to
tion of profit from the enterprise. Any profit or loss that does arise from the enterprise
may be so small and unimportant that the courts will be quick to look through it to
discover the real nature of the transaction.
89 If the scholarship plans were held not to be securities, and the trust fund not to
be an investment company, then it is possible that investors would enjoy no statutory
protection at all. There is no assurance that the states would apply Blue Sky Laws were
the SEC to find federal securities laws inapplicable, and state insurance regulation would
be inadequate. See Comment, The Expanding Jurisdictionof the Securities and Exchange
Commission: Variable Annuities and Bank Collective Investment Funds, 62 MIcH. L. Rv.
1398, 1407-08 (1964). The only alternative, which the states might reject, would be to
declare the plans illegal.
40 SEC Release, supra note 2, at 4. The Commission did not discuss the arguments
raised in applicant's brief concerning its status as an investment company, nor was it
disturbed by the possibility that the plans were not securities. See note 36 supra.
41 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a to hh-1 (1964).
42 15 U.S.C. § 78o (1964).
43 The rule states:
Every nonmember broker or dealer and every associated person who recommends to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security shall have
reasonable grounds to believe that the recommendation is not unsuitable for such
customer on the basis of information furnished by such customer after reasonable
inquiry concerning the customer's investment objectives, financial situation and
needs, and any other information known by such broker or dealer or associated
person.
17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1968).
44 The National Association of Securities Dealers was created under the Maloney Act,
15 U.S.C. § 78o-3 (1964), which sought to encourage strict ethical standards among brokers.
Mundheim, Professional Responsibilities of Brokers-Dealers: The Suitability Doctrine,
1965 DUKE L.J. 445, 446. The NASD is the only such organization to have registered
with the Commission. SEC, PUBLIC PoLcy IMPLICATIONS OF INvEsTMENT COMPANY GROWTH
62 (1966). As such it is exempt from the SEC suitability rule which applies only to brokers
who are not members of a national securities association.
45 CCH MANUAL OF THE NASD, RuLm o FAIR PRACTICE, Art. III, § 2 (1968).
46 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-l to -52 (1964).
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be an investment company makes mandatory certain provisions of that
Act which, unless exempted under section 6(c), 47 put the trust fund out
of business. Most notable is section 27(c)(1) of the 1940 Act 48 which
requires that periodic payment plan certificates49 issued by an investment company may not be sold unless they are redeemable securities.50
The scholarship plan, held by the SEC to be periodic payment plan
certificates,5 1 are certainly not redeemable. 52 To require redeemability
under section 27(c)(1) would have destroyed the essence of the plan.
The SEC did grant the necessary exemptions, but only on the condition of fair and adequate disclosure of the operation of the plan and
its related risks. The result of such action, however, may go beyond the
mere disclosure of the plan as now contemplated by the Sponsor. Since
a section 6(c) exemption is granted only where "necessary or appropriate
53
[to] the public interest and consistent with the protection of investors,"
the SEC may require the plan, as disclosed, to conform to its conception
of a safe investment. Using the section 27(c)(1) exemption for leverage,
the SEC may attempt substantive regulation of the scholarship plans
which exceeds a bare examination of the information contained in the
47 Section 6(c) enables the Commission to exempt any person, security, or transaction
from any part of the Act if:
such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest and consistent
with the protection of investors and the purposes fairly intended by the policy
and provisions of this subchapter.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c) (1964).
48 15 US.C. § 80a-27(c)(I) (1964).
49 A periodic payment plan certificate is defined in § 2(a)(26) of the 1940 Act to mean:
(A) [A]ny certificate, investment contract, or other security providing for a
series of periodic payments by the holder, and representing an individual interest
in certain specified securities or in a unit or fund of securities purchased wholly
or partly with the proceeds of such payments, and (B) any security the issuer of
which is also issuing securities of the character described in clause (A) of this
paragraph and the holder of which has substantially the same rights and privileges
as those which holders of securities of the character described in said clause (A)
have upon completing the periodic payments for which such securities provide.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(26) (1964).
Applicant Scholarship Club made an unsuccessful argument that the scholarship plans
did not fall within this definition. SEC Release, supra note 2, at 8-9.
50 A redeemable security is defined in § 2(a)(31) of the 1940 Act to mean:
[A]ny security, other than short-term paper, under the terms of which the holder,
upon its presentation to the issuer or to a person designated by the issuer, is
entitled (whether absolutely or only out of surplus) to receive approximately his
proportionate share of the issuer's current net assets, or the cash equivalent
thereof.
15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(31) (1964).
51 SEC Release, supra note 2, at 9.
52 Applicant argued that the scholarship plans were redeemable since the trust fund
was obligated to pay an award when the beneficiary qualified. Their arguments, however,
did not overcome the possibility of forfeiture. Id. at 8-9.
53 See note 47 supra.
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registration statement. For example, the Commission noted that it
would have jurisdiction to "consider the adequacy and accuracy of the
disclosure to be made in the Security Act prospectus and in sales literature to be used... ." which must include "some description of a feasible
and fair plan of distribution .

. . ."5

It is possible, therefore, that if

the incidences of forfeiture are not reasonable, or if the plan of distribution is neither realistic nor equitable, the SEC may either refuse to
accept the registration statement or may reconsider the 1940 Act exemptions. The result in both cases would be the same-prohibition of
selling the plans, as now structured, to the public.
Two specific exemptions were made contingent upon the existence
of satisfactory "disclosure." 55 One, exemption from the redeemability
requirement, was granted provided there was "a full disclosure of the
features of the plans with respect to the forfeiture provisions and their
57
consequences."5 6 The other dealt with section 23(b) of the 1940 Act
which would have prohibited the trust fund from selling its plans below
current net asset value. Because of the difficulty of determining the net
asset value of the scholarship plans, and since under section 23(b)(2) the
plans could be sold below net asset value with the consent of a majority
of the plan holders, this exemption was temporarily granted. The Commission added, however, that this uncertainty as to the value of the plan
was
another reason why a full and meaningful disclosure of the plan,
including a description of a specific method for determining the
amounts of distributions to beneficiaries, is of the utmost importance.58
54 SEC Release, supra note 2, at 6 (emphasis added).

55 The SEC also granted an exemption from §§ 16(a), 18(i), 27(a)(3), 26(a)(2)(A) and
(B) of the 1940 Act. It denied applicant an exemption from § 30(d). Id. at 7-11.
56 Id. at 9. On the day before this decision the Episcopal School Foundation College
Award Program sought an exemption from the same provision in a proceeding before
the hearing examiner. In this case, however, the exemption was denied on the grounds that:
To grant applicant's request for exemption from the provisions of Section
27(c)(1) would serve only to perpetuate the incidence of forfeitures which the
Congress decried. It is not enough to say, in respect of forfeitures, that the
investor is aware of the risk he takes. To whatever extent and under whatever
conditions full disclosure may be the sine qua non of the federal securities laws,
here the Congress specifically excluded forfeitures from any periodic payment plan
as adverse to the national public interest and the interest of investors.
ESFCAP Initial Decision, supra note 9, at 34.
This indicates that the question may be open for reconsideration in the near future.
57 15 U.S.C. § 80a-23(b) (1964).
58 SEC Release, supra note 2, at 10.
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IV
THE NECESSITY FOR FURTHER REGULATION

Federal regulation alone may not adequately protect the purchaser of a scholarship plan. The danger of unethical selling practices
survives the Commission's disclosure requirements since any quantity
or quality of disclosure may be ineffective.59 Likewise, although the
suitability rules provide some protection for the buyer, they do not
affect the broker who sold scholarship plans without recommending
them.
To insure full protection the seller must have an affirmative duty
in all cases to sell plans only to purchasers who understand the risk. It
must be the seller's obligation, therefore, to determine before sale
whether the purchaser in fact realizes the amount of money which may
be forfeited and is aware of the circumstances under which such loss
will occur. This will require on the seller's part a reasonable inquiry
of a prospective purchaser concerning his appreciation of the plan. The
seller may be compelled to explain the plan in detail, calling attention
to forfeiture and its consequences. This will not be necessary, however,
if the purchaser has previously studied the plan and understands the
nature and extent of the risk which he must assume. In this respect it
is not sufficient that the purchaser is given an opportunity to read a
prospectus. The purchaser must in fact read and comprehend the
prospectus, or acquire the same knowledge of the plan from some other
source. To assure such understanding, the seller may find it necessary
to review the rate schedule, the different instances of forfeiture, and
the uncertainty inherent in the method of distribution in all cases.
Considering the plans' reliance upon personal misfortune, however,
such a duty is not excessive.
There are other problems, unresolved by the SEC, which require
appropriate state action. One is the method of distribution of the
scholarship awards. The Commission held that disclosure of a "feasible
and fair plan of distribution" was required. 60 Whether the Commission
would have jurisdiction to regulate directly the allocation of assets in
59 The number of interested purchasers of a scholarship plan who actually bother to
study the registration statement may be negligible. It should also be noted that under
§ 5(b)(2) of the 1933 Act, 15 US.C. § 77(e) (1964), a prospectus need not be sent to an
investor before the security is sold if no offer to sell a plan has been made through the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce.
60 SEC Release, supra note 2, at 6.
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this situation is arguable. 61 In any event this problem seems to be more
appropriately left to state control. Any attempt to assure the most
equitable system of awards will demand a constant and thorough examination of each fund's performance. Such surveillance over a growing
number of scholarship plans could greatly burden the SEC. Moreover,
the factors which should influence any distribution may tend to be local
in nature-social and economic standards, cost of education, number
and character of participants in the plan, and rate of forfeiture. A state
should be able to develop an expertise in this area, and might create
an agency or department devoted to the regulation of the scholarship
plans. 62 This would especially be important now, during the experimental stage of the plans' development.
Under section 27(c)(1) of the 1940 Act,63 the SEC has the power
either to prohibit forfeiture or to supervise its occurrence. Hence, the
Commission could allow a plan exemption from this section on the condition that forfeiture be limited to certain situations or that the amount
of loss must not exceed a stated maximum. The Commission did not
expressly do this in The Trust Fund Sponsored by the Scholarship
Club, Inc. And it should not, since self-restraint on the part of the SEC
will allow a state, which is potentially better suited to guard against
the specific dangers of forfeiture, to regulate in that area.6 4 In the future
it may be possible to estimate the assets necessary to offer satisfactory
scholarships. If so, then the state can adjust the risk assumed by the
investor to correspond to the anticipated needs of the trust fund. If
such an estimate is not possible, or if it develops that the trust funds
do not realize enough profits to pay full scholarships, then the state can
always reconsider elimination of the plans. In any event the state can
and should regulate forfeiture so that it does not become confiscatory
or unreasonable. Here a balance must be reached between the obvious
effect of forfeiture and the potential benefit to be derived from the
plan.
61 As indicated, the Commission could control the allocation of fund assets indirectly
by refusing to grant the scholarship plans the necessary exemptions from the 1940 Act
or by holding up the registration statement until the plan of distribution was acceptable.
A more direct supervision of the distribution of earnings, however, would not appear to
be authorized by any specific provision of the 1940 Act.
62 Under the Florida statute the state treasurer as the ex oficio insurance conmissioner is authorized to regulate the operation and administration of the scholarship
plans. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 617.52(1) (Supp. 1969). Under the suggested scheme of control a
plan national in scope should be required to "qualify" in each state in which investors
were sought.
63 15 US.C. § 80a-27(c)(l) (1964).
64 The arguments for allowing a state to regulate the distribution of awards would
also be applicable here.
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The necessity for appropriate state control to complement the
federal securities statutes has yet to generate adequate legislation. States
into which the scholarship plans are now expanding 65 have done nothing
to counteract the potential dangers untouched by federal regulation.
Although the Florida legislature has promulgated numerous regulations
dealing with the scholarship plans, 66 investor protection is not complete.
The Florida statute requires a fair and reasonable method for distributing awards67 and advance approval of the plan by the State Commissioner. 8 However, it does not contain specific standards for the
permissible incidence of forfeiture nor does it offer guidance for the
Commissioner in his examination of the distribution of awards. On
these crucial points the legislature has failed to take a definitive position, leaving too much to the discretion of one man. Investor protection in this situation necessarily remains speculative.
Adequate regulation of scholarship plans requires state action;
the SEC alone cannot effectively protect the investor. Future action by
the Commission should be premised on the existence or non-existence
of such essential supplemental state control. 69 Only in this way will
the Commission avoid decisions that are adverse to the public interest
and to the interest of investors.
Paul D. McConville
65 See p. 779 supra.
66 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§

617.50-.81 (Supp. 1969).

67 Id. § 617-55(3)(b).
68 Id. § 617.55(2)(c).

69 The Commission's decision in The Trust Fund Sponsored By The Scholarship Club,
Inc. only related to the status of the fund. Scholarship plans, of course, will not be offered
to the public until the SEC approves the registration statement. Assuming that the SEC
grants similar exemptions under the 1940 Act to other funds offering scholarship plans,
the requirement of registration statement approval may be its only means of regulation.
What the SEC can accomplish through the registration statement, however, is uncertain.
See pp. 785-88 supra.

FUTURE ADVANCES AND FILING UNDER ARTICLE 9
OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
In many financing arrangements, a debtor receives several loans,
all secured by the same collateral, from a single creditor. The debtor
may partially repay the initial loan before obtaining another advance,
or the collateral may adequately secure all loans. This type of financing,
commonly known as future advance lending, can be effected in three
ways under Article 9 of the Code.1 The lender (L) may commit himself
in the security agreement to extend further credit. But financing agencies generally desire to control the timing and amount of further loans
and will not promise future advances. Accordingly, in the second
method, the security agreement will contain an optional future advance
clause providing for additional loans only at L's discretion. Finally,
the security agreement may be limited to the first loan, possibly because
the parties did not contemplate additional advances. This approach
may require execution of another agreement when L makes a second
advance.2

If L follows the Code's "perfection" steps when he makes the first
loan, 3 he obtains priority over the debtor's other creditors, at least to
the extent of the initial advance. 4 However, assuming both that L uses
1 All Uniform Commercial Code [hereinafter cited as UCO] citations are to the 1962
Official Draft unless otherwise specified.

2 See Safe Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Berman, 393 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1968). But see
UCC
REP. SERv. 2 (1968) (editor's comment); note 48 infra.
5
3 To obtain maximum protection for his advance, a creditor must follow five steps.
Section 9-204(1) requires that the debtor have rights in the collateral, that the parties agree
that the collateral shall be subject to a security interest in favor of the lender (in the
terminology of the Code, the parties agree that the security interest shall "attach'), and
that the creditor give value as defined by § 1-201(44) to the debtor. At this point the parties
have created a security interest.
To enforce the security interest against the debtor or third parties, the lender must
take possession of the collateral or the borrower must sign a security agreement containing
a description of the property. UCC §§ 9-203(1)(a), (b). Although this step is not required
to perfect a security interest, if it does not occur the interest will be worthless. See 1 P.
COOGAN, W. HOGAN & D. VAGTs, SEcuRED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM~! COMzaaRCmxL

CODE § 3.02, at 170 (1968) [hereinafter cited as COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS].
The creditor then perfects the security interest by filing a financing statement or by
taking possession of the collateral. UCC § 9-802.
4 Once perfected, the security interest defeats not only the claims of all unsecured
creditors who become lien creditors after the date of perfection, but also all subsequently
perfected security interests. UCC §§ 9-301(l)(b), 9-312(5)(a), (b).
This rule is subject to the general exception that if a purchase-money security interest
is perfected within ten days from the time the debtor receives possession of the goods, or,
in the case of inventory, if the holder of a perfected purchase-money interest has notified
other secured parties who have security interests in the inventory, then the purchase-money
interest receives priority. Id. §§ 9-312(3), (4).
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one of the optional agreements when he makes the first loan and that
he contemporaneously files a financing statement to perfect his security
interest, L's rights as against other creditors for the second loan depend
on whether the subsequent advance creates another security interest
and, if so, whether L must refile to obtain maximum protection for the
second loan.
Some authorities maintain that optional future advances create
new security interests; 5 others contend that the first loan produces one
security interest which secures all subsequent advances. 6 Adoption of
the single security interest approach eliminates the refiling question;
to receive maximum protection for a loan, the related security interest
must be perfected. 7 Each loan forms part of the same security interest,
and the initial filing perfects that interest. If this viewpoint prevails,
L's priority for all loans dates from the time of the filing and not
from the time of the advance. The initial filing protects all loans
against the claims of both unsecured creditors who become lien creditors
5 See 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VA rs, supra note 3, § 3.20, at 239-40, § 21.06(1) (b), at 220708. Adherents to the multiple security interest approach rely mainly on §§ 9-204(1) and

1-201(37). The former states that a security interest cannot attach until value is given.
Thus they argue that no security exists with respect to a subsequent advance until that
advance is made. Also, under § 1-201(37), a security interest "secures payment or performance of an obligation," from which the multiple security interest proponents contend
that each time a debtor becomes obligated to repay the lender-which would be each time
he receives an advance-a new security interest arises. Finally they maintain that the
multiple interest approach in the area of optional future advances is consistent with the
general structure of Artide 9 which adopts this same viewpoint in other fields; e.g., afteracquired property.
6 See 2 G. GiLMoRE, SEcuarry TRANsACSioNs iN P.RsONAL PROPERTY § 35.6, at 938 (1965).
Professor Gilmore argues that the initial loan satisfies the value requirement of § 9-204(l),
and that nothing in the Code suggests that the second loan creates a security interest when
value has previously been given. This view has received judicial recognition. See Friedlander v. Adelphi Mfg. Co., 5 UCC REP. SERv. 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968). However, the court implied that had the lender extended additional credit only for the purpose of depriving the
judgment creditor of his right to collect the judgment, the lender would have been acting
in bad faith and would not receive priority for his subsequent advance. Id. at 11. Since
the lender probably is not under a duty to act in good faith towards another creditor, at
least under the language of the Code (see §§ 1-203 & 1-201(19)), perhaps the court was
merely reiterating a pre-Code rule. In some jurisdictions, a lender did not receive priority
for his optional future advances if he had actual knowledge of an intervening creditor.
See 2 GILMORE, supra, § 35.4, at 927. However, example 4 in comment 4 to § 9-312 dearly
indicates that a lender receives priority for his advances even if he knows that other parties
have intervened. Cf. Bloom v. Hilty, 427 Pa. 463, 471, 234 A.2d 860, 863-64 (1967). One

commentator has analyzed the views of Mr. Coogan and Professor Gilmore and further
discussion here would be unproductive. See Ege in 2 COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note
3, §§ 21.09-17, at 2217-42. The language of the Code adequately supports either
approach, and both have considerable merit. See 2 GILMoRE, supra, § 35.6, at 938-39.
7 UCC § 9-303, Comment I.
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after the filing s and other secured creditors who perfect subsequent
to the filing.9
However, if optional future advances create new security interests,
refiling may be crucial to L's attempts to protect his additional loans.
His future advances may be subordinate to the claims of other creditors
unless he re-perfects. Furthermore, if L must record again to retain a
protected status, he cannot utilize the first-to-file rule as to subsequent
advances. Under this rule, if the filing which perfects a security interest
occurs before another financing statement is filed covering the same
collateral, the first filer obtains priority for that interest even if it
arose after the second filer created his interest. 10
2
Several Uniform Laws Comments" and many commentators
suggest that L obtains protection for optional advances without refiling.
However, the legislative history of the filing provisions and the language
of other relevant Code sections raise serious doubts whether the text
of Article 9 supports this viewpoint; a strong argument can be made
3
that L should not rely on the original filing.'
I
FING UNDER ARTICLE

9

A. Departuresfrom the UniformTrust Receipts Act and from Initial
Drafts of the Code
A comment to Article 9 states that the Code adopted the filing
system of the Uniform Trust Receipts Act (UTRA). 4 Under that Act,
8 Id. § 9-301(1)(b). The term "lien creditor" includes a creditor who has acquired a
judicial lien on the debtor's property, an assignee for the benefit of creditors, and a trustee
in bankruptcy. Id. § 9-301(3).
9 If the multiple security interest view is followed, L will not receive priority for any
loans as against unsecured creditors who become lien creditors before the loans are made.
Id. § 9-301(l)(b). Also, he will be defeated by secured creditors who perfect their interests
in a manner other than filing before he makes a further advance. Id. § 9-312(5)(b).
10 Id. § 9-312(5)(a).
11 See id. § 9-312, Comment 4, Examples 1, 4, & 5; id. § 9-402, Comment 2.
12 See, e.g., I COOGAN, HOGAN & VAGTs, supra note 3, § 4.08(4), at 299-300; L. DENNON,
SEcuRED TRANSACTrIoNs UNDER THE UCC § 5.7, at 40 (1965 ed.); Donnellan, Notice and Filing
Under Article 9, 29 Mo. L. Rxv. 517, 518 (1964); Kripke, Article 9 of Uniform Commercial
Code-Part II, 6 PMZs. FIN. L.Q. 35, 37 (1952). For a view contrary to these authori-

ties, see Note, Filing Requirements Under the Montana Uniform Commercial Code, 25
MONT. L. REv. 228, 240 (1964).

13 Article 9 expressly eliminates the necessity of refiling for a security interest in the
proceeds of the sale of collateral if the financing statement covered proceeds. UCC
§ 9-306(3)(a). See also id. § 9-306(5)(a) (refiling not necessary to perfect a re-attaching
security interest in returned goods if the filing has not lapsed).
14 Id. § 9-402, Comment 2.
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refiling was unnecessary if the financing statement identified the collateral securing optional advances. 15 A comparison of UTRA filing
provisions with their Code counterparts raises the question whether
Article 9 adopted this facet of the UTRA.
Section 13(4) of the UTRA provided that
presentation for filing of the statement . ...and payment of the

filing fee, shall constitute filing under this act.., as to any documents or goods falling within the description in the statement
which are... the subject-matter of a trust receipt transaction ....
As this section clearly indicates, one filing was sufficient regardless of
the number of loans if the parties limited the transactions to items
mentioned in the statement.
Also, section 18(1)(b) required the recorded statement to contain
a declaration that the secured party intended to engage in trust receipt
transactions. Because the initial filing indicated that several security
interests might be created, refiling each time a security interest arose
would be superfluous-the existence of that interest was already a matter of public record. By expressly requiring the lender to declare that
he intended to engage in many transactions, section 13(1)(b) further
indicated that subsequent loans did not require another filing.
Early versions of Article 9 contained language similar to that
found in section 13(4) of the UTRA. Under section 8-404 of the
October 1949 draft, presentation to the filing officer and payment of
the filing fee constituted filing "as to any collateral falling within the
description in the statement."' 6 This provision remained unchanged
until the Spring 1951 draft.'7 Also, comment 1 to section 8-302 of the
October 1949 revision stated that "[o]nce filed, the notice is effective
for the period stated ....and no further filing need be made for individual transactions ....."18 These early versions clearly allowed one
filing to perfect several security interests in collateral described by the
financing statement.
The statement required by the present Article 9 need not contain
a similar declaration of intent. Section 9-403(1) now provides that
"presentation for filing of a financing statement and tender of the filing
fee or acceptance of the statement by the filing officer constitutes filing
15 See 2 GiLMoRE, supra note 6, § 15.2, at 468.
16 The drafters did not intend any substantive change from the UTRA when they
altered the language in this revision. See UCC § 8-404, Comment 1, of the October 1949
draft.
17 See id. § 9-404(1) of the Spring 1950 draft and id. of the September 1950 revision.
18 Similar language is found in comment 1 to § 7-107 and comment 2 to § 7-410 of
the May 1949 draft. Section 8-302 became § 9-302, but this phrase in the comment was
eliminated when the section was revised.
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under this Article." This section does not imply that one filing suffices
for all transactions involving collateral identified by the statement.
Rather, it simply indicates the steps necessary for an effective filing and
is silent with respect to the extent of effectiveness.
However, three other sections of the present Code may support
the view that one filing perfects several security interests.
B. Current Code Provisions
1. Advance Filing: Section 9-303(1)
One referee in bankruptcy held that, where the parties filed when
they created a security interest, the Code's advance filing sections 9
permitted them to use the initial filing to perfect a later security interest
created under a new agreement. 20 Under section 9-803(1), a financing
statement on file can perfect a security interest arising after the date
of the filing. And since the parties filed before they created the second
interest, the initial filing perfected this new interest by virtue of section 9-303(1).21 Although a literal reading of the statute might appear
to support the referee, his approach suffers from two defects.
First, the legislative history of both sections indicates that they
were not designed to deal with whether one filing may perfect several
interests. Rather, they were drafted to resolve the lender's problem of
protecting a loan before it was made. 22 Some chattel mortgage statutes
required filing of the mortgage instrument itself.23 Accordingly, financing institutions simply assumed that the transaction had to occur
before the documents could be filed.24 To mitigate the dangerous time
gap between creation and filing, some statutes contained "grace period"
provisions which granted maximum protection to an unrecorded mortgage for a short time.2 5 But the UTRA, instead of offering a grace
period, allowed a lender to file prior to the time he created an interest.2 6
A question remained, however, whether such filing was effective.2 7
Section 9-402(1) continues the UTRA concept of advance filing, and
19 UCC §§ 9-402(l), 9-503(l).
re Merriam, 4 UCC REP,. Smv. 234 (S.D. Ohio 1967) (referee's opinion).
Id. at 256.
22 Suppose L knows on March 1 that sometime during this month he will enter into
a financing arrangement with D. To avoid delay between the creation of a security interest
and its perfection, L will want to file as soon as possible, optimally before he extends credit.
But will a March 1 filing perfect an interest arising on March 15? See UCC § 9-302, Comment 2 of the Spring 1950 draft.
23 See UCC § 9-302, Comment 2 of the Spring 1950 draft.
24 See 1 Guwoax, supra note 6, § 16.6, at 496-97.
25 See 1 GmMORE, supra note 6, § 16.6, at 498.
26 Section 1(1)(b) of UTRA. See also UCC § 9-312, Comment 4, Example 1.
27 See UCC § 9-312, Comment 4, Example 1.
20 In
21
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section 9-303(1) corrects the UTRA defect by expressly rendering advance filing effective. These provisions were inserted only as a substitute
for the grace period approach; 28 they were not intended to determine
29
whether one filing perfects several interests.

Second, to use section 9-303(1) in support of the view that one
filing perfects several interests requires the presumption that a filing
retains its capacity to perfect after once being employed for this purpose. 0 For example, if L files on March 1, and creates one security
interest on March 15 and another on April 1, does the recorded statement perfect both the March 15th and the April 1st interests? The Code
draftsmen failed to resolve this problem;8 1 and where priorities are
32
concerned, it is unsafe to rely upon unsupported assumptions.
2. The Financing Statement: Section 9-402(1)
One court stated that because the parties can record a financing
statement rather than a copy of the agreement, subsequent loans do not
require refiling.3 3 This assertion ignores three problems.
First, nothing in the financing statement required by section
28 See 1 GILMoRao,supra note 6, § 16.6, at 498.

29 See UCC § 9-302, Comment 2 of the Spring 1950 draft.
30 The necessity of this presumption is demonstrated by the following syllogism:
(1) A financing statement must be filed to perfect all security interests, UCC § 9-302(1);
(2) L can file before a security interest attaches, id. § 9-402(1); (3) that security interest is
automatically perfected when it arises, id. § 9-303(1); (4) therefore § 9-302(1) merely states
that to perfect a security interest, a financing statement must be on file; (5) therefore
when a second interest arises, and there is a filing on record, that filing perfects the second
interest; (6) thus one filing perfects several interests.
However, to derive step 5 from step 4, one must assume the result, i.e., that one filing
does perfect several interests. Without this assumption, step 4 suggests only that the initial
filing perfects a security interest arising thereafter; and this premise alone does not imply
that the filing perfects all later created interests.
31 Since this problem only arises if the multiple security interest theory prevails, the
draftsmen may not have foreseen the single-multiple interest dispute.
32 The confusion surrounding § 9-303(1) results from the similarity between the
advance filing problem and the question of whether one filing covers several interests.
A majority of security interests will arise after the parties first file. Thus these concepts
are related in two ways. If Article 9 prohibited the automatic perfection provided by
§ 9-303(1), one recording could not perfect several interests. But even with this procedure,
it does not necessarily follow that one filing is sufficient.
And if the Code were silent with respect to automatic perfection and expressly allowed
one filing to perfect many interests, then automatic perfection would naturally result.
But merely because the ability to perfect several interests inherently includes the automatic
perfection procedure does not necessarily suggest that the converse is true.
But see 2 F. HART & W. WILUER, FORMS AND PROCEDURS UNDER THE UCC § 91A.08,
at 9-69 (1968).
33 The court in Household Fin. Corp. v. Bank Comm'r, 248 Md. 233, 235 A.2d 782
(1967), reached this conclusion in deciding whether a financing statement was a recorded
lien or evidence of obligation.
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9-402(1) justifies the conclusion that one filing suffices. Under the Code,
the filed statement need contain only the following items: names and
addresses of the parties; their signatures; and a description of the collateral. 84 If new security interests require refiling only when the recording is misleading, then of course one recording suffices for all future
advances. But this section does not state that the test of refiling turns
on the accuracy of the statement. Section 9-402(1) may suggest that the
truth of the statement controls refiling in such other areas as afteracquired property or products of collateral, but it does not imply that
this test applies to optional future advances. Since the Code expressly
allows a financing statement to cover after-acquired property or products, refiling may not be necessary for security interests created by the
addition of property already identified by the recording. Otherwise,
no reason exists for permitting the lender to specify on the statement
that it covers these items. But because the Code does not expressly
permit the inclusion of optional future advances on the financing statement, one cannot infer that section 9-402(1) intended to eliminate
refiling for interests created by subsequent loans.3 5
Second, a statement complying with the minimum requirements
of section 9-402(1) does not state on its face whether the lender has more
than one interest.3 6 Since a creditor would file a statement only if he
34 UCC §§ 9-402(1), (8). A survey of official forms reveals that most of them require
only the items specified in § 9-402. California's official form has a space for the amount
of the debt, but this provision is optional. See, e.g., 2 HART & WILUm, supra note 32,
§ 91A.04, at 9-40 to 9-62.
35 Since Article 9 allows the parties to file a copy of the agreement (UCC § 9-402(1)),
and since the agreement can contain an optional future advance clause (id. § 9-204(5)),
the inference that the test of refiling turns on the accuracy of the filing appears applicable
to optional future advances when agreements are recorded. And since refiling does not
appear necessary when agreements are recorded, arguably it is also unnecessary when the
financing statement is filed. Otherwise, inconsistent results would be produced. But the
statute does not indicate that optional future advance clauses are permitted in the agreement in order to prevent others from being misled when searching the files. The absence
of express permission to include such clauses in the financing statement suggests that they
are not allowed in agreements in order to prevent others from being misled. Rather, the
sole purpose of permitting the agreement to contain such clauses was to validate the
future advance interest. See 2 COOcAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 3, § 21.06()(b), at 2209;
UCC § 9-204, Comment 8. Even if the multiple security interest approach prevails, permitting the inclusion of optional future advance clauses still serves some function-they
eliminate the necessity of executing supplemental agreements with each loan.
36 Depending on the type of property involved, a financing statement might imply
that several interests exist. In accounts receivable or inventory financing, the collateral
constantly changes. Each time the debtor acquires new accounts or inventory, a new
security interest arises. UCC §§ 9-204(1), (2)(d). If the statement mentions this type of
collateral, it may suggest to a knowledgeable financing institution that the lender has or
expects to have several interests. But if the security arrangements involve some other
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has or intends to have a security interest, the filing indicates that he
may have an interest. But beyond that, the filed statement is neutral
with respect to the number of security interests which have been or
37

may be created.

Finally, section 9-402(1) does not support the contention that one
filing is sufficient. This section sets forth the formal requirements of a
financing statement 8s and was designed to inform filing officers when
to accept statements and to aid courts in ascertaining which statements
constitute a proper filing.8 9 The section was never intended to imply
that one filing is sufficient.
3. "Effectiveness" Argument: Section 9-403(2)
Section 9-403(2) states that a filed statement "is effective for a
period of five years from the date of filing" unless the statement provides for a shorter period. Because the parties may file before a
security interest arises, and since that interest is perfected when it
attaches, "effective" might mean the ability to perfect. Thus a filed statement arguably is effective for the purpose of perfecting every interest
created during the five year period. Although section 9-403(2) does not
expressly reject this possibility, the use of the word "effective" in other
property, such as the equipment of the debtor or his personal car, which does not turn
over frequently, the statement on its face implies that the lender has or expects to have
only a single interest.
Although there may be some merit in distinguishing between financing arrangements
on the basis of the collateral involved, except for a single statement in comment 2 to
§ 9-402, there is no indication that the drafters intended this result. By including all types
of security arrangements under one statute, and because all appear to be subject to the
same rules, save for a few specific exceptions (e.g., compare § 9-312(3)(b) with § 9-312(4)),
the inference is that all arrangements are to be treated the same with respect to the necessity of refiling. See commint 2 to UCO § 7-410 of the May 1949 draft.
37 Mr. Coogan raises the question whether the financing statement would perfect
security interests in the same kinds of collateral as that described in the statement if the
interests were created under later agreements. He suggests that the parties include a
statement of intent indicating whether more than one transaction is intended. 1 COOGAN,
HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 3, § 6.04, at 498.
Here the question is whether the financing statement will perfect many security
interests in the same collateral described by the statement. The two questions are basically
identical, for the quality of notice as to the property impaired is the same in each case.
88 The title of this section is "Formal Requirements of Financing Statement; Amendments:' Section captions are part of the Code, and not mere surplusage. UCC § 1-109;
see comment to § 1-109; comment 1 to § 9-402.
89 See comment 5 to § 9-402. Moreover, "[p]art 4 deals, in an adjective sense, with
the procedure of filing, whereas part 3 deals, in a substantive sense, with the effect of filing
or failing to file." Kupfer, Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code-Part IV, 6 PEas.
FiN. L.Q. 96 (1952) (emphasis in the original). Comment 1 to § 9-302 states that
"[p]axt 4 ... deals with the mechanics of filing: place of filing, form of financing statement and so on."
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parts of this subsection demonstrates that the term does not mean the
ability to perfect.
"Effective" clearly refers to a filing which maintains the perfected
status of a security interest over a period of time.40 If "effective" means
the ability to perfect as well as the ability to maintain the interest as
perfected, "ineffective" should logically mean not only that an interest
would, become unperfected, but also that a filed statement could no
longer perfect interests. However, when the effectiveness lapses, section
9-403(1) states only that "the security interest becomes unperfected."
This provision does not equate an ineffective filing with one lacking
the ability to perfect; thus the term "effective," as used in section
9-403(2), refers only to a filing which can maintain the perfected status
of a security interest. Even though one effect of a filed statement is to
perfect an interest, nothing suggests that the drafters intended "effective" to mean the ability to perfect.41 Rather, they directed their attention only to the problem of establishing an appropriate length of time
42
during which the security interest was to remain perfected.
Sections 9-403(2) and 9-402(1) and the advance filing provisions do
not resolve whether one filing perfects several interests created by future
advances. At best the Code is silent on this issue, thereby placing the
optional future advance lender in a dilemma. If he refiles, he is protected against unsecured creditors who become lien creditors after the
time of filing. But this second filing may bar the application of the
first-to-file rule to the extent of subsequent advances, causing defeat by
intervening secured creditors. By attempting to utilize this rule and not
refiling, the lender runs the risk that his new security interests may be
unperfected. Finding himself in either of these two positions, an optional future advance lender might profitably advocate a liberal construction of the advance filing provisions. Because the Code never
expressly states that one filing is insufficient, he could urge a court to
assume that the automatic perfection provided by section 9-303(1)
applies to both the initial security interest and subsequent ones. And
he could support this position by demonstrating that refiling is unUCC § 9-403(2). See also comment 3 to this section.
The term "effective" as used in a preceding section, § 9-402(5), means the ability
to perfect, but this section was added to the official text in 1957, five years after § 9-403(2)
was drafted. Also, this term as used in § 9-402(4) does not mean the ability to perfect,
but rather the time that a security interest becomes perfected. See § 9-306(5)(a), in
which the same word means that the period has not expired. See also Kupfer, supra note
39, at 96, and UCC § 9-302, Comment 1.
42 The comment to § 7-411 of the May 1949 draft states that "[n]o reason is apparent why' the holders of long-term obligations . . . should be required to re-file, on
penalty of losing their liens, periodically during the life of the obligation."
40

41
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necessary from a practical standpoint; the single filing gives adequate
notice of the property impaired. But this approach does not guarantee
success. Some courts, to avoid adopting a presumption that one filing
is adequate, have emphasized the nature of the security agreement
giving rise to the future advance.
II
THE JUDICIAL APPROACH TO THE PRIORITY PROBLEM

One court implied that only advances under a security agreement

43
containing a future advance clause are protected by the original filing.

This implication is correct only if the court was referring to an
agreement containing a binding future advance provision. However,
since Article 9 allows a lender to include an optional clause in his
agreement, 44 the court probably would also grant priority to loans
made under this type of agreement while withholding protection from
advances extended through separate agreements. If so, the court's distinction is invalid; 4 5 the only distinction should be between agreements
binding the lender and those that do not.
If optional future advances create new security interests, Article 9
requires identical treatment of loans under optional future advance
agreements and loans under agreements limited to a single advance.
Priority depends on perfection, and the perfection rules do not distin43 In re Rivet, 4 UCC REP. SFmV. 1087 (E.D. Mich. 1967) (referee's opinion).
44 UCC § 9-204(5).
45 Example 4 to comment 4 of § 9-312 perhaps supports Referee Bobier's position,
but the relevant portion of this example is so vaguely drafted that it is difficult to draw

any conclusion from it. Moreover, it indicates that the second advance under the original
agreement creates a new security interest, and if this interest is automatically perfected
when made, then a separate interest under a new agreement is automatically perfected
when made-the filing provisions accord equal treatment to both types of agreements.
See note 46 infra. Under the 1952 version, the Referee might have been correct, for
§ 9-312(2) provided:
A secured party who has a perfected security interest and who makes later
advances to the debtor on the same collateral and under the same security
agreement takes priority as to the later advances from the time when his
security interest was originally perfected.
However, this section was substantially revised and the relevant part of § 9-312 now states
that
priority between conflicting security interests in the same collateral shall be determined as follows: (a) in the order of filing if both are ... perfected by filing, regardless of which security interest attached first . . . and whether it attached before
or after filing ....

UCC § 9-312(5)(a).
There is no suggestion in this section that the first-to-file rule applies only to security
interests created under one agreement.
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guish between security interests on the basis of the agreement creating
them.4 6 An optional future advance clause in the security agreement merely eliminates the need for executing supplemental agreements with each advance; each loan automatically creates an enforceable
security interest. But the enforceability of more than one interest under
a single agreement does not necessarily result in the perfection of
more than one by a single filing. Equating enforceability requirements
with perfection requirements ignores the Code's distinction between
them.

47

Also, if a court applies the single-security interest theory to loans
made under an agreement containing an optional clause, it should accord
the same treatment to advances extended through separate agreements. 48
46 If the automatic perfection provided by § 9-303(1) allows one filing to perfect
several interests, it fails to differentiate between these two types of agreements. This
section states that if a security interest arises under an agreement which was executed
after the parties filed, that security interest is perfected. Also, if a security interest arises
under an agreement which existed at the time of filing, that security interest is perfected.
See 2 HART & WILaam, supra note 52, § 91A.08, at 96-98.
If § 9-402(l) provides a test for determining whether the lender must refile in order
to receive protection for his loans, there might be some rational basis for treating these
arrangements differently. In accounts receivable or inventory financing, the debtor will
usually need periodic loans. The security agreement may commonly contain an optional
future advance clause in order to eliminate the necessity of executing supplemental agreements with each loan. The collateral described by the financing statement indicates that
several transactions are contemplated (see note 36 supra); thus one filing provides
adequate notice that many security interests are intended. This situation presents the
dearest case for allowing a lender to receive priority for all of his advances without the
necessity of refiling. The single filing alerts others to the possibility that several security
interests may be created, and since many loans are made in this type of financing arrangement, the lender would be substantially burdened if he had to refile with each advance.
However, a future advance clause can be used in any financing arrangement; and if these
two types of collateral are not involved and unless the parties indicate that several transactions are contemplated, the financing statement suggests that the lender has only one
interest.
Assuming that the term "effective" in § 9-403(2) means the ability of a filed financing
statement to perfect several interests, there is no reason for not applying this meaning to
both types of agreements.
47 Under the Code, enforcement procedures are governed by § 9-205 and perfection
methods are found in § 9-302. See also 1 COOcAN, HOGAN & VAGTS, supra note 3, § 4.04(l),
at 279-80; 1 GXmmoRE, supra note 6, § 15.2, at 468-69.
48 For example, L executes a security agreement which reads that the debtor grants a
security interest "to secure repayment of $1,000 and any future advances which L, in his
discretion, may decide to make." C uses an agreement which states that the security interest
"secures repayment of $1,000." The following month both L and C advance another
$1,000 loan, each secured by the same collateral as the first advance.
The single security interest theory holds that the initial loan satisfies the value requirement of § 9-204(1), and nothing in the Code suggests that the second loan creates another
interest when value has previously been given. 2 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 55.6, at 988.
This rationale applies with equal force to both agreements. Concurrence on the extent of
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A second court considering the priority problem indicated that it
also would distinguish an optional future advance agreement from one
limited to a single loan.49 First, the court reasoned that an agreement
without such a clause would weaken the borrower because the lender
could refuse to extend additional credit, and no one else would lend
money to the debtor since the first lender would have priority for his
subsequent advances.50 This rationale is invalid because an optional
the security interest when created is irrelevant in determining if a second loan produces
a new interest. Section 9-204(1), in setting forth criteria for creating a security interest,
does not consider agreement on the scope of attachment; it focuses only on whether the
parties agreed that the interest shall attach. See 5 UCC Ra ,.Shav. 2 (1968) (editor's
comment).

Alternatively, C's second advance accompanied by a promissory note may be thought
of as an amendment of the description of the debt in his security agreement. Id. However,
C may encounter difficulties if he attempts to enforce his security interest beyond the first
loan without executing another agreement. Although § 9-203 requires only one agreement
to enforce a single interest, § 9-201 states in part:
Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the collateral and
against creditors.
But the comment to § 9-201 provides that "[t]his section states the general validity of a
security agreement." The New York annotations to this section state that "[t]he emphasis
here and throughout the Code is on the general effectiveness of a security instrument,
whereas older statutory provisions are often phrased in negative terms." From this it may
be contended that § 9-201 deals with the question of whether a security agreement is
effective at all, and not with the extent to which it is effective. See 1 COOGAN, HOGAN &
VAGTs, supra note 3, § 3.04(1), at 279.
Furthermore, since the security interest encompasses the second loan, and since the
lender can enforce his security interest without the execution of a second agreement,
arguably he can enforce his security interest to the extent of the second loan regardless of
the terms of the first agreement. However, perhaps § 9-203 also was not directed toward
this problem, for comment 5 states that "[t]he formal requisites stated in this Section
are not only conditions to the enforceability of a security interest against third parties.
They are in (sic] nature of a Statute of Frauds." Here also, it may be contended that this
section deals with the question of whether a security interest can be enforceable at all,
and that it does not reach the problem of the extent to which it can be enforced. One
court faced this issue, and applied § 9-201. See case cited note 2 supra. The question is
quickly resolved under the multiple interest theory, because another agreement must be
executed to enforce the interest created.
Suppose C executes another agreement when he makes the second advance; under
the single interest theory would this produce a new security interest? Even though a
security agreement, under § 9-105(l)(h), is "an agreement which creates or provides for a
security interest," arguably the second agreement does not produce a new interest. To
analogize from Professor Gilmore's theory, the initial agreement that the security interest
shall attach satisfies the agreement requirement of § 9-204(1), and nothing in the Code
suggests that the second agreement creates a new interest when the parties have previously
agreed that the interest shall attach. Hence, the subsequent agreement is a nullity insofar
as the creation of a security interest is concerned.
49 Coin-O-Matic Serv. Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 3 UCC R P. Saav. 1112
(Super. Ct. RI. 1966).

so Id. at 1116-17.
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future advance clause does not force the lender to make additional
loans. Moreover, even if the agreement contained a binding commitment, the creditor could probably refuse to make further loans without
fear of suffering legal injury.51
Second, the court decided that only contemplated future advances
received protection under the original filing, and that the execution
of a second agreement indicated an absence of contemplation.52 Although one authority arguably supports this view,5 the perfection
provisions do not distinguish between planned and unplanned security
interests.54 Moreover, because it may be impossible to divine the parties' plans accurately, introducing their intentions into the priority
analysis results in undesirable uncertainty. 55
The court's final argument for differentiation was grounded in the
disclosure requirements of section 9-208. Usually the financing statement contains only the required items. 56 If interested third parties
desire more information, they are under a duty to make further inquiries,57 and section 9-208 provides a method of obtaining additional
details. The court implied that if the agreement includes a future
advance clause, section 9-208 requires the lender to divulge this fact.
Without such a clause in the agreement, the information provided
would not reveal whether further advances are contemplated. The
court, apparently assuming that the original filing protects additional
loans under an optional future advance clause, concluded that, absent
such a future advance clause, a potential lender can not determine if
51 See 2 GILMoRE, supra note 6, § 35.4, at 926; J. HONNOLD, IAW OF SALs AND SALT
FINANCING 678 (8d ed. 1968).

52 Coin-O-Matic Serv. Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 3 UCC REP. SERv. 1112,
1119-20 (Super. Ct. RI. 1966).
53 2 HART & WmLmR, supra note 32, § 91A.08, at 9-68.
54 Only the advance filing provisions can possibly support this distinction. The argument might run as follows: Unless the parties contemplated the creation of a security
interest or the execution of a security agreement, there would be no reason for them to file
a financing statement. Thus § 9-402(l) inherently aims at contemplated security interests
and agreements. However, since § 9-402(1) allows filing before the parties execute an
agreement, if the parties contemplated several agreements, the lender need only file once.
Thus merely because the lender executes another agreement does not deprive him of the
protection of § 9-402(1).
For an authority who maintains that uncontemplated interests created under new
agreements receive protection under the original filing, see Mr. Coogan's comments in
Symposium, A Practical Approach to the Uniform Commercial Code for the Practicing
Lawyer, 19 Bus. LAw. 5, 52 (1963).
55 See Safe Deposit Bank & Trust Co. v. Berman, 393 F.2d 401, 404 (1st Cir. 1968).
But see 2 HART & Wi.aR, supra note 32, § 91A.08, at 9-68.
56 Note 34 supra.
57 See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. State Pub. School Bldg. Auth., 26 Pa.
D.&C,2d 717, 732 (Co. Ct. 1961).
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his loans will be subordinate to later advances of the first creditor. Thus
the first creditor in this case should not receive priority for his additional loans.58 Although this is the best argument for treating each
type of agreement differently, it can be attacked on two grounds.
Section 9-208 may not require a lender to disclose whether the
agreement covers future advances.5 9 If so, neither type of agreement
will apprise an interested third party that the creditor may extend
future loans.
And, even if the lender reveals that the agreement contains a future advance clause, this information may be worthless. At the time of
disclosure, the lender may not contemplate further loans, or he may
not know their amount. Thus a potential lender could not in any case
determine whether the collateral is sufficient to secure both his loan
and any additional credit extended by the first creditor. 0
58 Coin-O-Matic Serv. Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 3 UCO REP.SFRv. 1112,
1119 (Super. Ct. R.I. 1966).
59 See, e.g., 1 COOGAN, HOGAN & VArms, supranote 3, § 6.08(5), at 529; 2 GrLaopE, supra
note 6, § 35.5, at 933. The secured party must act in good faith when disclosing this
information. UCC § 1-203. Therefore he cannot deliberately mislead one who seeks further
details of the financing arrangement. 2 GILMORE, supra note 6, § 35.5, at 933. But perhaps
this obligation of good faith applies only to an honest statement of the aggregate amount
of indebtedness, and of the collateral securing the loans-the only things mentioned 'in
§ 9-208. See HONNOID, supra note 51, at 678; Cohen, The Future Advance Interest Under the Uniform Commercial Code: Validity and Priority, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. Rlv. 1, 6
(1969).
60 Of course, if the debtor has a copy of the agreement, and it contains a future
advance clause, a third party may anticipate additional loans. But examining the document may not be worthwhile because it may not specify the amount of subsequent advances, or the third party may have difficulty in determining whether the agreement
actually covers future advances. For example, does an agreement which states that the
security interest secures repayment of the present loan and "all other indebtedness present
or future, due or to become due, now existing or hereafter arising" cover future advances?
Section 9-201 provides that a security agreement is effective according to its terms unless
the Code otherwise provides. Article 9 does not expressly invalidate this type of clause,
and § 9-204(5) does not specifically require that the agreement mention the words "future
advances." See 2 GmwoRE, supra note 6, § 35.5, at 932. But see 0. SPiVAcG, SECURE
TRANsAcrONs 31 (1963 ed.). In Charles S. Morton Distrib. Co. v. First State Bank, 114
Ga. App. 693, 152 S.E2d 599 (1966), a pre-Code case, the court indicated that a similar
clause covered future advances. See also In re Midas Coin Co., 264 F. Supp. 193 (ED). Mo.
1967), citing UCC § 9-201.
Section 9-204(3) of the 1952 version provided that "a security agreement may provide
that collateral . . . shall secure any advances made or other value given at any time
pursuant to the security agreement." Comment 8 to § 9-204 stated in part that future
advances were valid, "provided only that the advance be made pursuant to a term in the
security agreement." In 1957 the drafters revised § 9-204(3) which now states that "a
security agreement may provide that collateral . . . shall secure all obligations covered
by the security agreement." And the relevant portion of comment 8 now reads that future
advances are valid, "provided only that the obligation be covered by the security
agreement:'
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Perhaps there is some merit in distinguishing between the types
of security agreements employed, but the supporting arguments are
unconvincing. Moreover, the lender does not lose any rights by inserting an optional future advance clause in the security agreement, 61 and
the borrower does not gain any advantage if the agreement contains
such a clause. Since the term optional future advances does not affect
the debtor-creditor relationship, the presence or absence of this innocuous phrase should not determine priority.
CONCLUSION

Article 9 has been highly publicized as providing a filing system
under which one recording suffices regardless of the number of agreements involved. 62 Operating under this assumption, a secured lender
may fail to examine the files to ascertain if any other secured creditor
has intervened between his first and later loans.63 Moreover, believing
that one filing is adequate, a belief not supported by the text of Article
9, he will not refile with each advance. Thus he may have an unperfected security interest, subject to the assault of secured and unsecured
creditors alike. 64
To clarify the law governing commercial transactions, the Code
should be amended to state under what circumstances one filing perfects
several interests. Since a single filing gives adequate notice of the propAlso, § 9-204(5) has been substantially revised. In 1952 this section provided that:

[a] security agreement may provide that collateral under it shall secure future
advances.

Comment 8 to this section stated in part that "collateral may secure future as well as
present advances when the security agreement so provides." Section 9-204(5) now states
that:
Obligations covered by a security agreement may include future advances or

other value whether or not the advances or value are given pursuant to commitment.
This change in § 9-204(5) prompted one commentator, emphasizing the word "whether,"
to conclude that future advances no longer have to be made pursuant to a term of the
agreement. Note, Legislation, 5 ViLL. L. Rav. 465, 471 (1960). The relevant portion of
comment 8 was not altered. Although this comment fits the 1952 text, it does not conform to the 1962 version which fails to mention collateral. These alterations in §§ 9-204(3)
and 9-204(5) suggest that at the most only the obligation to repay additional loans must
be mentioned in the agreement, and it need not include the term "future advances."
61 Under the Code's definition of value, a lender does not give any more value when
he executes a security agreement containing an optional future advance clause than when
the agreement is limited to the present loan. UCO § 1-201(44)(a).
62 See sources cited note 12 supra.

63 See Coin-O-Matic Serv. Co. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co., 3 UCC RP. SErv.
1112 (Super. Ct. R.I. 1966).
64 See In re Rivet, 4 UCC R., SERV. 1087 (E.D. Mich. 1967) (referee's opinion).
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erty impaired, a refiling serves no practical purpose. The only real
consideration is whether, as a policy matter, a future advance lender
should obtain priority over intervening secured creditors who perfect
by filing. One relevant factor is the proper allocation of the burden of
examining the filing records; should the first creditor bear it or should
intervening lenders? Simplicity suggests that the burden should be on
the latter, for then each lender need check the records only once. A
contrary rule forces all lenders to investigate the filings with each advance thus expending needless time and energy. These two factors,
adequate notice and the burden of examination, point in the direction
of requiring only one filing.
Consideration of the debtor's position suggests the opposite conclusion. Giving the first lender priority effectively ties the borrower to
him for five years; new lenders would refuse to give him credit for that
period. However, this element presents no difficulty if the borrower
intends a permanent change of lenders or if he can induce the first and
second lenders to enter into a subordination agreement. A different
situation exists where the debtor contemplates only a temporary switch
of creditors, and the first lender declines to execute a subordination
agreement. A debtor, once confronted with the refusal of a creditor
both to advance money and to subordinate his interests, will probably
not return to the same creditor; accordingly, this case may present no
real difficulty. The more common situation is probably where the
debtor intends only a temporary change, and the second lender is
unaware of the first-either through the debtor's deceit or the second
lender's failure to examine the records. And in neither case does the
second lender deserve priority over subsequent advances of the first
lender; he is solely responsible for his ignorance.
Finally, the future advance lender should receive priority over
all creditors for amounts advanced before they became lien creditors
or fulfilled the perfection requirements. His refiling serves no purpose
in this situation. But to give him priority here, without refiling, while
denying him priority over intervening secured creditors would require
a major revision of Article 9.
Simplicity, consistency, and the relevant policy considerations all
point toward allowing one filing to suffice. And the arguments apply
both to agreements containing an optional future advance clause
and to agreements limited to a single loan, regardless of whether
the parties execute additional agreements with each advance. Therefore,
section 9-302(1), which lists several situations in which filing is unnecessary to perfect a security interest, should be amended by adding
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the following subsection: "[S]ecurity interests in the collateral described
by a filed statement created within five years from the date of filing by
advances under a security agreement or agreements."' 6 5
Robert H. Scott, Jr.
65 If the amendment were phrased in this manner, the drafters would not be forced

to resolve the single interest-multiple interest dispute.
Alternatively, under either type of agreement, the first lender's priority could be
limited to funds advanced before a second creditor invokes § 9-208. Accurate risk calculation will encourage the second lender to make advances, and thus the debtor, motivated
by lower interest rates or other better terms, could easily change lenders. However, unless
the second creditor fulfills his obligation to search beyond the records, the first lender
under any type of agreement should receive priority for all loans. Unaware that a rival
exists, he can legitimately assume that the collateral suffices to secure his additional
advances. Since § 9-208 requires a written statement, the second creditor can readily prove
that he used this section.
Adopting this solution would require some revision of Article 9. Although a secured
creditor would not worry about refiling in order to protect his loans against potential
lenders, he would still be concerned about unsecured creditors becoming lien creditors
after he made some advances. Without refiling, a secured creditor may not receive priority
over lien creditors for his additional loans. To effectively utilize the § 9-208 approach, the
secured creditor would still have to be granted an exemption from refiling.

